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Employing the neutral Kindleberger definition of a bubble as “an upward price movement over an
extended range that then implodes”, this paper explores the causes of the “Japanese Bubble” of 1985
to 1990 without precluding the possibility that the bubble was due to perceptions of fundamentals.
Survey evidence indicates that at the peak of the bubble in the second half of 1989, the majority of
Japanese institutional investors thought that the Nikkei was not overvalued relative to fundamentals.
Such a belief was not entirely unfounded.  Long-term real interest rates fell sharply between 1985
and 1986, and the view that there was a significant increase in the permanent component of the growth
rate was defensible though certainly not undeniable.  Invoking the literature on asset prices with heterogeneous
beliefs and limitations on short sales, the paper argues that in a period characterized by the arrival
of news that is difficult to digest and subject to multiple interpretations, it is the more optimistic assessments
of fundamentals that are likely to be reflected in the market equilibrium.  At the same time, high prices
resulting from the heterogeneity phenomenon are fragile and prone to collapse.  From this vantage
point it is perhaps not surprising that the Japanese Bubble, as well as the subsequent implosion, appeared
when they did.   Survey evidence on investor beliefs during the bubble period, as well as the covariation
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  Between January 1985 and December 1989 the real value of the Nikkei 225 
stock price index tripled.   By the middle of 1992, the index in real terms was less than 
20% above its January 1985 level.  While this paper focuses on the equity market, land 
prices behaved similarly.  An index of land prices in Japan‟s six largest cities almost 
tripled in real terms between 1985 and 1990.   Land prices fell more gradually than did 
stock prices, but by 1998 the real land price was no more than 20% higher than its 1985 
value.  Without making any presumption as to the cause (or the “rationality”) of this 
dramatic asset price behavior, we will refer to it as the “Japanese Bubble” observation
2.     
Much previous discussion of the Japanese Bubble and similar asset pricing 
phenomena focuses on whether the price behavior was “justified by fundamentals” or, 
alternatively, indicative of either “irrationality” or “speculative” behavior.   Alternatively, 
one might pursue the idea that there are legitimate differences of opinion as to what is the 
“right” model with which to interpret the available signals about fundamentals.  Models 
in which agents have heterogeneous beliefs about fundamentals occupy a fruitful middle 
ground between those in which agents with strictly rational expectations focus 
exclusively on fundamentals and those heavily “behavioral” models that eschew 
fundamentals and focus either on irrationality or purely speculative motives.   Using 
survey data - especially the results of an interesting survey of Japanese institutional 
investors by Shiller, Kon-Ya, and Tsutsui (1996) - in addition to market data, I illustrate 
how this “disagreement” approach to asset pricing might help us to understand the 
Japanese data.  
                                                 
2 I thus adopt the neutral Kindelberger (1996) definition of a bubble as merely “an upward price movement 
over an extended range that then implodes”.      3 
Our story goes roughly as follows.   The period from 1955 to 1975 was one of 
extraordinary productivity growth.  In line with the world productivity slowdown, Japan 
entered a low growth regime in 1974, with little sign of a reprieve at least until 1986.  
Beginning in 1986, there were vague “New Economy” signs.   Growth in GDP, corporate 
earnings and dividends picked up.   Between 1985 and 1986 the cost of capital had 
apparently fallen due to a loosening of monetary policy by the Bank of Japan and perhaps 
also financial liberalization.  Consider two extreme readings of this situation.   The 
optimist believes that a New Economy period has indeed arrived.  The renewed growth is 
a sign that the productivity slowdown that began in 1974 has partially attenuated, and the 
low interest rates are in part a permanent consequence of financial liberalization and 
other developments in the real economy rather than the transitory result of easing by the 
Bank of Japan.  The pessimist takes the opposing view on both counts.  
With the foregoing observations in mind, we see an explanation of the Japanese 
bubble emerging.  A subset of investors decided that high growth and perhaps low 
interest rates were going to continue indefinitely, justifying a permanently higher price of 
equity on fundamental grounds.  These investors were able to borrow and make their 
voices heard, while their bearish counterparts were silenced by constraints on short sales
3.    
The high growth rates, in particular, were subject to multiple interpretations, particularly 
as to whether they were merely transitory or were an early manifestation of a new era 
with a permanently higher rate of growth as compared with the previous decade.  After 
all, Japan had experienced astronomical growth prior to 1974 and without the benefit of 
                                                 
3 We should state at the outset that it is not true that short sales were either completely forbidden or 
technically impossible in Japan during this period.  However, for extensive evidence of limitations on 
short-sales in Japan during the period in question, see Schaede (1993).  I review the issues in Section III 
below.   4 
hindsight there was perhaps little reason to conclude that the productivity slowdown was 
not partly transitory.  
 One might focus on the relative reasonableness of the two positions, but the 
heterogeneity theory takes a different tack.  Its key insight is that of the two positions, it 
is that of the optimist that is likely to prevail in the market.  It is certainly fair game to ask 
whether the two positions are equally rational, and – if not – to inquire what sorts of 
„behavioral finance” considerations or cognitive errors might be responsible for belief in 
the seemingly less plausible scenarios, as we do near the end of section II.   In this 
framework, though, whether or not the optimists and pessimists are equally rational is an 
interesting but second order issue.  It is the optimists rather than the most rational agents 
that prevail in equilibrium.   
  In Section II I review, with some new twists, the case for rationalizing the 
behavior of stock and land prices via the Gordon formula in the context of a 
homogeneous agent model.  Both growth rates and interest rates moved in the right 
direction to lend some support to this approach.    However, there are obstacles in the 
way of a satisfactory account of the Japanese experience based on these considerations 
under homogeneous beliefs.    First, many agents must have questioned, as the economist 
with the benefit of hindsight certainly does, whether the changes in real interest rates and 
growth rates could have been sufficiently persistent.   Second, if one can rationalize the 
high prices of the late 1980s based on growth rates, prices should have been even higher 
in the extraordinarily high growth regime prior to 1974 - unless the risk premium was 
also especially high in this period.   Third, if agents believed the growth rate was   5 
permanently higher, consumption should have – counterfactually - risen sharply relative 
to current income.    
  At least two of the above obstacles would be significantly less severe in a world 
of heterogeneous beliefs.   The persistence problem would be mitigated if we allow for 
disagreement about the extent to which the new higher growth rates reflect a permanent 
change in the economy rather than a temporary aberration.   At worst, in the 
heterogeneous beliefs framework only a fraction of the agents in the economy need be 
guilty of a cognitive error in extrapolating from the recent past to the indefinite future.  
The consumption problem is mitigated because aggregate consumption reflects the 
beliefs both of stockholders and those who are out of the market.    
   Section III introduces recent theoretical ideas about asset pricing when agents 
have heterogeneous beliefs about fundamentals, particularly when there are institutional 
or other limitations on short sales.    The basic theory, as sketched by Miller (1977) and 
elaborated by Harrison and Kreps (1978), Chen, Hong and Stein (2002), Scheinkman and 
Xiong (2003) and others, says that in the presence of constraints on short-sales, the value 
of the market is determined by the most optimistic agents.   Even with many bearish 
investors, the market will be high if optimists have sufficient wealth or borrowing 
capacity and if pessimists have sufficient limitations on their ability to sell short.     
  One might wonder if the theory of heterogeneous beliefs under short sales 
constraints, while facilitating explanation of the high prices at the peak of the bubble, is 
primarily a theory of systematic overvaluation rather than a theory of booms and busts 
that can explain why there was a bubble between 1986 and 1990 and not before, and why 
the bubble collapsed when it did.   This need not be the case.   Heterogeneous beliefs are   6 
fueled by news that is difficult to interpret, and the heterogeneity may subside as events 
unfold.   As we detail in Section III, there are also somewhat more esoteric reasons that 
heterogeneity-induced elevation of asset prices is fragile and not prone to persist forever.  
  Turning next to the data, we find that even at the height of the bubble, a high 
fraction of investors thought the market was not overvalued relative to fundamentals.   
Belief  heterogeneity is high near the peak of the bubble, and attenuates as the bubble 
collapses. Further, many - but not all - of the predictions of dynamic models with 
heterogeneous beliefs appear to characterize the data.   Many agents who believe that the 
market is overvalued relative to fundamentals believe that the price will not fall in the 
short run, presumably because other agents are willing to hold the stock at the existing 
high price.   Volume is high at the peak of the market and falls dramatically as the market 
collapses.  The expectation that volatility also is highest at the peak, however, is not 
confirmed by the data.   Section IV summarizes and concludes the paper.    
 
II.  Rationalizing the Japanese Bubble: The Gordon Formula Under Homogeneous 
Beliefs 
          Figure 1 shows the real value of the Nikkei 225 index in monthly data from 
1980 to 1995.   As noted in the introduction, the real value of the Nikkei 225 stock price 
index tripled between January 1985 and December 1989.   By the middle of 1992, the 
index was less than 20% above its January 1985 level in real terms.   Figure 2 shows 
annual data on the real price of urban land in Japan‟s six largest cities over the same 
period.  The index almost tripled in real terms between 1985 and 1990.  Land prices did   7 
not implode quite as rapidly as stock prices, but by 1998 the real land price was no more 
than 20% higher than its 1985 value
4. 
   In this section we focus on evidence as to whether or not the behavior of stock 
prices can be interpreted as a natural response to fundamentals – in particular, growth 
rates and interest rates.  Much applied work has already been conducted in the Gordon 
formula context in the case of Japan (French and Poterba, 1991; Frankel, 1991, and Ito 
and Iwaisako, 1995 are good examples).   The results have been somewhat inconclusive, 
but have for the most part shed doubt on the plausibility of a fundamentals-based 
explanation of the bubble and its collapse.  I conclude that, though are many reasons for 
doubt, there is at least an interpretation of the data in which the prices at the peak might 
well have been justified by expectations of fundamentals.   This will set the stage for the 
next section, in which I argue that it is likely that this optimistic reading of the 
fundamentals is the one that would be reflected in the equilibrium price.    
  I begin by reviewing the behavior of valuation ratios (dividend and earnings 
yields) between 1980 and 1992.   I draw attention to the pre-existing condition of low 
yields as of the beginning of this period, and explain why that made the later appearance 
of a bubble more likely.   We then turn to the determinants of yields, focusing first on the 
real interest rate and then on the growth rate of the economy.  I show that there were 
                                                 
4 This paper will focus on stock prices alone.  However, before leaving the topic of land, 
we should dispose of a frequently made argument that price appreciation of land held by 
corporations caused of the stock market boom. One form of the argument is based 
directly on the value of the land in companies‟ portfolios.  A more subtle version is that 
land served as collateral for bank loans to corporations and raised equity values by 
facilitating corporate borrowing.   Neither of these arguments is satisfying.  First, stock 
prices lead (and Granger-cause) measured land prices (though that may be because the 
measured land prices lag behind true land prices).  More fundamentally, theory tells us 
that stock and land prices are functions of the same underlying economic forces – namely 
growth rates and discount rates – and are thus jointly endogenous. 
   8 
indeed changes in both the interest rate and the growth rate going in the right direction, 
but that it is hard to determine whether or not a rational fundamentals-based model would 
have given rise to asset price variation of the magnitude seen in the data.  We go on to 
discuss the pros and cons in some detail, focusing especially on the issue of whether or 
not fluctuations in real interest rates and growth rates were sufficiently persistent.    The 
remaining ambiguity suggests that is precisely the sort of situation in which a 
disagreement model is appropriate.  
 
II-a. The Gordon Formula and Variation in Dividend-Price and Earnings-Price Ratios  
  The traditional fundamentals-based approach to market valuation is in a 
representative agent framework, and focuses on the discounting of expected cash flows 
by an appropriate discount factor  .   The classic analysis of valuation ratios that comes 
out of this approach, the Gordon formula, tells us that the dividend/price ratio is equal to 





5.    
According to the Gordon formula, fundamental value changes if and only if the current 
level of dividends, the growth rate of dividends, or the required return changes.   Our task 
is therefore to find measures of at least some of these quantities.  Strong and persistent 
                                                 
5 To derive the Gordon formula in a simple context, we first define fundamental value as equal to the 
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.  Pastor and Veronesi (2003) show that the Gordon 
formula holds when dividends follow a diffusion process with constant drift g.  The simple Gordon formula 
stated here does not apply when dividend growth follows a general stochastic process rather than remaining 
constant, but we discuss in the text an approximate dynamic Gordon formula that handles this case.    9 
movements in these fundamentals would warrant equally impressive movements in stock 
prices, while an absence of appropriate variation in growth rates and interest rates would 
suggest that an explanation of movements in the price relative to dividends would have to 
rely either on misinterpretation of fundamentals or on nonfundamental, speculative  
considerations.  
  Figure 3 shows stock yields – both dividend price and earnings price ratios in 
monthly data from 1980 to 1992.   Several interesting points arise from figure 3.   To 
begin with, the Japanese bubble story doesn‟t really start in 1985-86.  Between the 
beginning of 1982 and the beginning of 1985, the dividend yield fell from 1.5  to  .88   - 
more than  it did between 1985 and 1987.   This rarely discussed fact is important for two 
reasons.   First, it puts the further drop in yields from the beginning of 1986 to the end of 
1989 in perspective.  Second, as we make clear below, it is because the yields were so 
low at the end of 1985 that the subsequent percentage changes in the stock price were so 
large.  
  Japanese dividend yields were chronically low by U.S. standards.  One might be 
concerned that this is simply a mechanical consequence of the fact firms were not paying 
out a high fraction of earnings in the form of dividends (indeed, between 1970 and 1984 
real dividend growth was negative) and that perhaps the dividend price ratio is less 
meaningful than, say, the earnings price ratio.  This view is mistaken, because  retention 
of earnings implies higher profits in the future, and eventually higher dividends as well.    
Further, as Figure 3 makes clear, earnings yields are themselves low.   The real reason for 
the low yields is that Japan did not have an “equity premium puzzle” as did the United   10 
States.  Our best guess of the risk premium in Japan in the 1980s suggests it was not 
much more than a couple of hundred basis points.   
  The chronically low level of dividend and earnings yields points to the 
underlying principle behind the possibility that prices might not have been out of line 
with fundamentals.   When the required return is only slightly above the long-rate 
expected growth rate of an asset‟s earnings stream, asset prices can be both “nearly 






shows that when   is close to g,  not only will the level of asset prices be high, 
but the logarithmic derivatives of fundamental value with respect to each of the three 
determinants (current cash flows, expected growth rates, and discount rates) will be large 
in absolute value (see Barsky and DeLong, 1993)
6.    For instance, at the peak of the 
market in 1989, the dividend yield was as low as one-half of a percent per year.  If we are 
willing to argue that this is consistent with fundamentals, it is not difficult to generate a 
crash as well.   We turn next to the determinants of yields flagged by the Gordon formula 
to see if the fundamentals approach to stock yields is a tenable one.   
 
II-b.  Movements in the Required Return  
  The Gordon formula points to the required rate of return   as one determinant 
of stock yields.   This in turn consists of a riskless rate and an equity premium.   
Unfortunately, little can be discerned about how the equity premium might have varied 
                                                 
6 Note that all of these derivatives will have a factor r-g in the denominator . The  point was stressed in 
the Japanese context by Boone and Sachs (1988)  and French and  Poterba (1991).    11 
over time
7.   We do, however, know that the Bank of Japan reduced the discount rate 
sharply at the beginning of the bubble period, and raised it equally sharply at the end.   
These interest rate movements are often cited as the cause of the inception and collapse 
of the bubble  ( see, e.g. Okina, et al, 2001;  and Hoshi and Kashyap, 2001).   
  On the other hand, Ito and Iwaisako (1995) note that the interest rate-based 
explanation of the bubble depends on the presumption  - very likely incorrect -  that the 
movements in  interest rates were largely permanent.   A way to see their general point is 
to work with the log linear approximation to the Gordon formula that holds when 
required rates of return and dividend growth rates are non-constant over time but follow 
stationary stochastic processes (the “Dynamic Gordon growth model” -  see Campbell, 
Lo, and Mackinlay, 1997, p. 260-267).  One version of the formula (equation  7.1.22 in 
Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay) tells us that the log stock price  t p  can be written (apart 
from a constant) as an expected  present value of weighted future log dividends and 
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7 Merton (1980) shows for the case of the United States that using historical stock returns to estimate the 
required expected return on the market leads to unreliable estimates – the time series is too short given the 
great volatility of the market.  The same argument applies a fortiori for Japan, given the shorter time series 
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          (2). 
Equation (2) is a satisfying framework in which to discuss the persistence problem.  
  Suppose we take   = .99, to reflect the fact that the dividend price ratio in 1985 
hovered around .01.    If interest rate movements are all permanent, ρ = 1 and the change 
in the log price is 100 times the change in the interest rate    If = .95 (in annual data), on 
the other hand, the change in the log price is only about twenty times the change in the 
interest rate; i.e a one hundred basis point drop in the interest rate would raise the market 
value by about 20%.   Thus to have large effects on stock prices, interest rate movements 
must be not only persistent but more or less permanent.  The choice of = .95 corresponds 
to a half-life of about six years; for an interest rate reduction induced by monetary policy, 
this is a long time.  Yet its effects are far too small to justify the bubble observation.   
    Suppose we wish to explain the change in the dividend price ratio from .01 to 
.005 between 1985 and 1986.   The simple Gordon formula tells us that a permanent 
reduction in the real interest rate of 50 basis points would do the job.   The actual drop in 
the real rate exceeded 100 basis points (see below), but was not necessarily permanent.    
A 100 basis point drop would have a potency equal to that of a 50 basis point permanent 
drop only if phi is as high as .98, corresponding to a half life of some thirty years.  
  Table 1 shows annual averages of the official discount rate, an index of long-
term government bond rates, and a measure of the expected  real  long-term rate using the 
ten year forecast of inflation from Data Resources, Inc.   (The nominal long-term interest 
rate series is very close to the series for the ten year bond rate given by the Bank of 
Japan).   While theory tells us that variation in real short rates associated with monetary   13 
policy ought to be short-lived, Table 1 suggests that there was an impressive reduction in 
real long-term interest rates of 120 basis points between 1985 and 1986, and a subsequent 
rise of 100 basis points between 1989 and 1990.   
   Ito and Iwaisako (1996) focused on the persistence of the short term real rate 
(which of course has implications for long-term rates through the term structure).  
However, the fact that long-term real rates fell as much as they did means either that the 
presumption that the Bank of Japan could not reduce real rates for years at a time is 
incorrect or that we were witnessing something other than exogenous monetary policy.   
Perhaps the Bank was in part responding endogenously to economic forces that militated 
for a lower real rate
8 or perhaps the Bank had been holding the interest rate above the 
natural rate prior to 1986, so that the 1986 rate was in fact sustainable.   
   Ultimately, Ito and Iwaisako  may or may not be correct in their conclusion that 
the interest rate reduction can‟t explain much of the 1985-1986 stock price increase.    
Our interest rate measure is roughly the ten year real rate.  Yet we have seen that 
expectations at much longer horizons are highly relevant to the stock price; much 
depends on the forecasts reflected in the very long end of the yield curve.   One might 
imagine that there is a lot of room for differences of opinion across investors as to 
whether or not disturbances that persist for ten years are closer to permanent or closer to 
transitory.   
          
II-c. Growth Expectations  
  The second determinant of fundamental value that the Gordon formula points to 
is the growth rate of cash flows.  How much variation in growth rates was there, how 
                                                 
8 For example, appreciation of the yen was a major motive for the rate decrease ( see, e.g. Ito,2003)   14 
persistent was it, and what fraction of stock price fluctuations would it explain?  Figure 4 
shows annual growth in real GDP and real dividends.   Both measures show a sharp 
upturn in growth between 1986 and 1988.   GDP growth peaks in excess of six percent 
per annum.   Dividend growth rises strikingly, from slightly negative to four percent per 
annum.   It is true that the first part of the market boom actually comes at a time of weak 
growth that preceded the high growth period of 1987-1989, but for 1985-1986 we have 
the drop in the interest rate to fall back on
9.   Both growth measures show sharp declines 
between 1989 and 1991, offering at least some hope for those who would attribute the 
crash in asset prices to a decline in expected growth.    
  Figure 5 shows two survey measures in the form of index numbers:“Business 
Conditions” from the Tankan Survey, and Income Growth Expectations from the Survey 
of Consumer Confidence.  After considerable weakening in 1985 and 1986, both 
measures rose dramatically in 1987 and 1988, and fell equally dramatically in 1990 and 
1991.  These data further the finding that there was a period of high expected growth and 
favorable perceptions of the overall business environment, which also ended abruptly.     
   As in the interest rate case, a key question is whether the changes in expected 
growth rates were sufficiently persistent to have strong leverage on the price.   The g in 
the dynamic Gordon formula is the “permanent” growth rate of dividends.   Even if 
growth rates were to be elevated for a period of several years, the effect on the very long-
run growth rate would be quite modest.   French and Poterba (1991) illustrate this point 
by considering (among others)  a scenario in which investors expect  temporarily high 
                                                 
9 It might also be that the stock market was anticipating growth to come, though one also has to consider 
the possibility that the boom and bust in the real economy could have been the result rather than the cause 
of the stock market fluctuations.  
   15 
earnings growth due to a  supernormal rate of return on reinvested corporate earnings that 
is expected to last ten years – the horizon of our survey expectation of Nikkei earnings 
growth.  The effect of even ten years of elevated earnings growth on the stock price is 
still only a fraction of the effect of a permanent rise in the growth rate.   As in the interest 
rate case, even quite persistent transitory processes cannot deliver the required near-
permanence of growth changes.    
However, the conclusion that growth rate changes were clearly not persistent 
enough to justify large swings in asset prices runs into a potential contradiction when one 
considers a longer sample period.    Over the period 1955:2 to 1973:4, the mean  growth 
rate of GDP was an astronomical 8.8%, while from 1974:1 to 2001:4, mean growth was 
2.7%.  Clearly there was a permanent shock somewhere.    If it were known with 
certainty that there was a once-and-for-all shift in the mean growth rate in 1974:1, say, 
then it would be appropriate to regard subsequent fluctuations in growth rates as 
transitory and to conclude that they could not possibly account for major asset price 
fluctuations.     On the other hand, there could be periodic small, permanent shocks that 
have major implications for asset prices without accounting for much serial correlation in 
growth rates, and these can be hard to detect in finite samples (Barsky and DeLong, 
1993).   Without the benefit of hindsight, would it not have been equally reasonable to 
believe that the reduction in growth after 1973 was due partly to transitory shocks?   
Might not a Japanese investor in 1987 have reasonably believed that he was witnessing a 
partial return of the high growth period?   
The classic stochastic process that captures the idea of a mixture of permanent 
and transitory shocks is  t t t gp   , where the permanent component t p is a random walk   16 
and the transitory component t   is a white noise process uncorrelated with the innovation 
in  t p  (see Muth, 1960).   
To an agent (or an econometrician) that does not separately observe the 
permanent and transitory components, the growth rate has the 
representation 11 t t t t gg       , where  t  is white noise and 01   .   Here  t  is the 
innovation in the growth rate (a composite of the transitory component and the 
innovation in the random walk component), and  is the fraction of each period‟s 
innovation that is transitory.   If  is close to 1, most of the innovation is transitory, and 
the overall growth process will exhibit little serial correlation.   Yet, as we shall see, the 
relatively small permanent component can have major implications for asset prices.   The 
process implies that the estimate of the permanent component is a distributive lag on past 
growth rates with geometrically declining weights, and that for  close to one, the 
weights decline very slowly.   
Estimation of the above process for quarterly GDP growth from 1955:2 to 2001:4 
yields an estimate of  equal to .90.  Figure 6 shows the implied permanent component 
of g.   The permanent component falls dramatically in 1974 and 1975.  Though most of 
the loss is never made up, there is a rise in the permanent component of more than a 
percentage point between 1986 and 1989 – far more than is needed to explain the drop in 
the dividend price ratio over this period.   
The above process fits Japanese GDP growth rather well, but the dividend process 
less well.   Alternatively, one might deal with the persistence problem by moving 
somewhat into the behavioral realm.  Barsky and Delong (1993 b) argue that 
“extrapolative expectations” of dividend growth – expectations formed as a distributive   17 
lag on past growth rates - help to account for a century of stock price behavior in the U.S. 
and  interpret such expectations as “reasonable” - though not necessarily strictly 
“rational” - rules of thumb.   A regards extrapolative expectations, particularly those that 
put much weight on the recent past, as the result of a cognitive error - a“New Economy 
fallacy” under which high recent growth rates are expected to continue forever.   Since it 
is unlikely that all agents in the economy would exhibit the same sorts of cognitive 
idiosyncrasies, this route would seem to bring us naturally into the world of 
heterogeneous beliefs.  The new economy fallacy would then become an explanation of 
the optimism of one category of bullish investors.   It is worth noting that even when this 
story is told with less than fully rational agents, it is still a story about perceived 
fundamentals rather than speculative processes.  
  For the second half of 1989 on, we have direct survey information on expected 
earnings growth at a fairly long horizon.  Figure 7 plots the ten year expected growth in 
Japanese corporate earnings from the survey of Japanese institutional investors 
introduced in Shiller, Kon-Ya, and Tsuitsui  (1996) and discussed in detail in our next 
section
10.    The data are semi-annual.   In addition to focusing on the earnings of the 
Nikkei companies, this has the advantages that it addresses the horizon over which 
growth expectations are being assessed and that the horizon is a relatively long one
11.    
  The results in Figure 7 indicate that mean expected earnings growth in the 
second half of 1989 and in 1990 was quite high - somewhat in excess of 5%
12. Let us 
                                                 
10 Question wordings are found in the Appendix.  
11 Still,it is difficult to say whether or not the stated expectation contains a perceived temporary 
component.   When investors answer the question about ten year earnings expectations, are they giving 
their expectations into the indefinite future, or do they have in mind(along the lines of French and Poterba, 
1991) a scenario in which there will be a prolonged, but finite period of “supernormal” earnings growth?   
12 There is an unfortunate gap in the data collection in the first half of 1990, but one might interpolate and 
assume that expected growth was approximately 5% throughout 1990.   18 
provisionally take the position that these are expectations of earnings growth for the 
indefinite future.  Table 1 tells us that the ten year real interest rate at the end of 1990 was 
3.0%.   If we take that to be the very long-term interest rate, then the 5% growth 
expectations and the dividend yield of 0.5% imply a very reasonable equity premium of 
2.5%.   In this sense, the level of the stock price in 1990 does not seem to be particularly 
excessive
13.   Further, the reduction in expected earnings growth to 4.25% by the second 
half of 199, coming on top of the 100 basis point rise in the real interest rate the previous 
year, if anything over-explains the rise in the dividend price ratio.     
  The conclusion that developments in the growth rate of the economy may have 
been an important part of the story behind the Japanese bubble is furthered by the 
observation that an increase in uncertainty about the growth rate has the same effect on 
asset values as an increase in mean growth.   Pastor and Veronesi (2003) show that when 









(where the expectation is over the subjective distribution of g),   They note that the 
convexity of the function 
1
g  
 in g implies that the expectation rises with the variance 
of g.   The idea that g is particularly uncertain in the period in question fits well with the 
notion that mixed signals regarding the possibility of a  “new economy” were difficult to 
interpret.  It also suggests that this era was ripe for differences of opinion across agents 
and that a heterogeneous beliefs model is an appropriate way to model this period.  
                                                 
13 Recall that Japanese equity premia have historically been lower than those in the U.S.  One might be 
concerned that the implication that the required return on equity is only 5.5% is in conflict with Figure 13 
below, which shows Japanese investors‟ expected return on the Nikkei to be about 10% .   That, however, 
is a one-year expected return, whereas the required return in the Gordon formula calculation is the infinite 
period return.    19 
  One reason for doubting that high growth expectations are the explanation for the 
bubble observation is the behavior of aggregate consumption.   If expected growth rates 
were high for the long haul, PIH considerations suggest that this would have shown up in 
consumption that was abnormally high relative to income.   Figure 8 shows the actual, 
fitted, and residual values from the regression of log consumption on log GDP 
withannual data over the period 1955  to 1998 .    The regression residuals indicate that 
conditional on income, consumption was not in any way high during the bubble period.   
It is hard to believe that consumption would not have risen more sharply relative to 
income if all agents in the economy believed that growth would continue indefinitely at 
four percent or more.   On the other hand, a heterogeneous agent model in which only 
some people believed that growth rates were very high would have a better chance of 
matching the consumption observation  
 
III.   Heterogeneous Beliefs, Survey Data, and the Japanese Bubble 
In the previous section we argued that there is some reason to believe that 
fundamentals shifted in a way that ought to increase asset values sharply, but that the 
generation and collapse of expectations of high growth and low discount rates in a world 
with homogenous beliefs may or may not be sufficient to provide a satisfactory account 
of the Japanese stock and land markets between 1985 and 1992.   In this section, we 
examine the implications for Japanese Bubble analysis of allowing agents to have 
heterogeneous beliefs about growth rates and fundamental value, particularly in 
conjunction with limitations on short sales.   We outline some of the implications of 
heterogeneous beliefs treated in the literature, and point out how they might address some   20 
of the most serious embarrassments that arise in the homogeneous beliefs case.  We then 
examine some evidence on whether the implications of models with heterogeneous 
beliefs and short-sale constraints are to be found in the Japanese stock market in this 
period.   
Some of the evidence we examine is in the form of statistics about stock prices, 
volume, and volatility.  However, we make particular use of the Shiller, Kon-Ya, and 
Tsutsui (1996) survey data.   Because beliefs about both fundamentals and possible 
speculative processes are so central to the stories we consider in this section, it is 
essential to have a window into investors‟ minds.  To the best of our knowledge, no data 
other than SKT ask for investors‟ assessments of price relative to fundamentals, or 
investors‟ assessments of the beliefs and actions of other agents in the market.  We first 
present the theoretical background and then proceed to a discussion of the survey data 
and presentation of the results.  Our findings will suggest that heterogeneous beliefs 
models with short-sale constraints do indeed help to provide a more satisfactory account 
of what happened during the Japanese Bubble period.  
 As noted in the introduction, there were no wholesale prohibitions on short-
selling in Japan in the 1980s.   However, there were a number of important legal and 
institutional restrictions that sharply limited short-selling in practice.  These are carefully 
detailed in Schaede (1993).  Most notable among these are the prohibition on naked short 
sales (those in which the stock is neither owned nor borrowed by the short-seller) and the 
uptick rule (short sales cannot be carried out at a price lower than that of the preceding 
trade).  Schaede notes that most short-selling by securities companies was of the “against 
the box” variety, in which the motive is merely hedging inventories.     21 
Schaede (1993) proposes as a measure of the importance of short-selling the ratio 
of average outstanding short interest to average daily trading volume.   She reports that 
this number was 49.3 percent in 1988, 48 percent in 1989, and 104 percent in 1990.  In 
comparison, she cites 210 percent as a representative number for the U.S. during that 
period.   By this measure short-selling in Japan was a quarter to a half of what it was in 
the United States, where short-selling is already costly and quite circumscribed (see 
Lamont, 2004).    
Heterogeneity of beliefs may arise in theoretical models for several reasons, 
including a) differences in priors and b) differences in information in combination with 
overconfidence regarding one‟s own judgment (as the latter causes agents to place 
excessive weight on their own signals and thus dismiss the information value of the other 
agents‟ market behavior).   Classic contributions of Miller (1977) and Harrison and Kreps 
(1978) established the theoretical implications of combining heterogeneous beliefs about 
fundamental value with constraints on short-selling.   The very intuitive basic insight is 
that with restrictions on short-selling, agents with the most pessimistic assessments of the 
asset‟s fundamental value are not able to express their beliefs via market behavior, so that 
asset prices then reflect the beliefs of the more optimistic investors only.  An increase in 
the degree of heterogeneity that also represents an increase in the most optimistic 
valuation of the assets thus raises market value.   At the same time, if this heterogeneity-
based “overvaluation” arises because of differential interpretations of news, it is fragile 
and prone to crashes as the news is digested and a consensus begins to develop.   
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iii-a. Heterogeneous Beliefs, Short Sales Constraints, and Share Valuation 
To offer a sense of how the interaction of disagreement and short sales constraints 
raises prices, we sketch here a two-period model taken from Chen, Hong, and Stein 
(2002) that demonstrates the effect of the degree of heterogeneity on the level of the asset 
price and the corresponding expected return.   This can be thought of as a formalization 
of the Miller (1977) model, which is static and emphasizes the disproportional effect of 
optimists on the asset price.   Dynamic models, which emanate from Harrison and Kreps 
(1978), have additional implications that we will address later on in this section.   
There are Q shares of a stock that pays a one-time dividend of F+ε  per share in 
the second period (the “fundamental”).    Two kinds of agents trade the stock in the first 
period: a group of “buyers” who cannot go short, and a group of rational arbitrageurs who 
can take short or long positions, limited only by risk aversion.    The “buyers” have 
heterogeneous beliefs, represented by a uniform distribution of valuations on the interval 
[F-H, F+H] centered on the true fundamental F, with a degree of heterogeneity measured 
by H.   Let the buyers have constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility with risk 
tolerance γB and the arbitrageurs have CARA utility with risk tolerance γA.     
Normalize the total mass of buyers to one.   It is well known that CARA utility 
gives individual asset demands that are linear in the deviation between the individual‟s 
valuation V and the market price p , where the constant of proportionality is the risk 
tolerance .   Thus buyer i has asset demand   B  ( i Vp  ), which of course can in general 
be negative.   Integrating over the distribution of valuations, we see that if the buyers 
were permitted to sell short, the total market demand would be   23 
1




B i i A
FH





     , 
where the second additive term is the demand of the arbitrageurs.   Letting Q be the 
outstanding quantity of the asset, and setting 
DU QQ  ,   it is  not hard to show that the 









The price is increasing in the mean of the fundamental and the risk tolerance of both 
types of agents, decreasing in the asset supply, and  - most importantly -  independent of 
the degree of heterogeneity H. 
If, on the other hand, we impose that buyers cannot sell short, the demand of a 
buyer with valuation Vi will be equal to  [0, ( )] Bi Max V P   .  Integrating over the buyers 
and adding the demand of the arbitrageurs, we have market demand characterized by  
1
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Chen, Hong, and Stein (2002) show that the short-sales constraint is binding when 







, and that the equilibrium price 
in that case exceeds the price when short-sales are unconstrained.   Finally, the price is 
increasing in H.   This result is intuitive, because a rise in H adds positive asset demands 
without creating any offsetting negative demands.  Thus the degree of heterogeneity is   24 
positively related to price, and (since the stock simply pays a liquidating dividend in 




iii-b.  Heterogeneous Beliefs in the SKT Survey Data 
In this section, we use survey data to document the heterogeneous beliefs of 
investors during the bubble period.    We show that there was a great deal of divergence 
of opinion as to whether or not the market was overvalued relative to fundamentals, and 
that this divergence of opinion generally varied in the way that the theory predicts.  In 
particular, belief heterogeneity was high at the high of the bubble and attenuated as the 
bubble crashes.    We also show that on the whole, institutional investors did not believe 
that the bubble was due to purely speculative considerations.    Rational or not, beliefs 
about fundamentals played a central role in generating  the bubble.   
In our attempts to acquire information about expectations, beliefs, and sentiments 
of participants in the stock market, we employ data from the Survey of Investor Behavior 
conducted by Shiller,  Kon-Ya, and Tsutsui (1996).   As noted above, the SKT Survey is 
in the form of a written questionnaire aimed at institutional investors in Japan and was 
given semi-annually.  We have already used the data from the SKT question on the 
expected growth of corporate earnings.  Here we make use of questions aimed at 
diagnosing overvaluation beliefs (beliefs that the market is too high relative to 
fundamentals) and speculative considerations in investor decisions, as well as questions 
about the expected return on equity.   
                                                 
14 Park (2005) shows that in U.S. data, high dispersion of analyst‟s earnings forecasts predicts low 
subsequent returns.    25 
As we have stressed throughout, the appearance of a bubble based on beliefs 
about fundamental value does not require that all (or even most) agents have high 
expectations for fundamentals.   Figure 9 shows the fraction of Japanese investors that 
believe that the market is not overvalued relative to fundamentals.  At the peak of the 
bubble in 1989, over 60 percent thought that the market was not overvalued.   Just 
proceeding the collapse, some thirty percent of the respondents still regard the market as 
correctly priced (or even underpriced).   Thus there was a large group of investors ready 
to hold the market on the basis of their own beliefs about fundamentals, without invoking 
any speculative considerations.     
Figure 10 shows two additional variables that might be considered measures of 
overvaluation beliefs – a) the fraction claiming that the trend of prices is primarily 
“speculative” and b) the fraction citing excessive “excitement” about stocks.   We learn 
several things from Figure 10 .  First, assertions that the trend is primarily speculative or 
that excitement about stocks is excessive are alternative statements of the view that the 
market is high for reasons other than fundamental ones.     The small fractions expressing 
these views are thus welcome confirmations of the results in Figure 9.  Second, these 
responses seem inconsistent with some popular alternative accounts of the high equity 
prices.   If there were a rational speculative bubble of the sort discussed above, agents 
would have been aware of it, and would describe the “trend” in stock prices as “mostly 
speculative” 
15. 
Figure 11 shows the result of computing a natural measure of heterogeneity 
among Japanese investors:  h= f(1-f), where f is the fraction regarding the market as 
                                                 
15 Since in a rational bubble each agent is behaving appropriately given the equilibrium, respondents might 
not describe excitement about stocks as excessive.    26 
overvalued.   This measure is at a maximum when f=.5 –  i.e. when half believe the 
market is overvalued and half believe it is not.  In line with the theory, heterogeneity is 
high near the peak of the bubble and falls sharply during the crash.   On the other hand, 
the second period of strong disagreement between 1993 and 1995 is not met be a renewed 
bubble, though it correctly predicts a powerful market decline of some forty percent 
between 1996 and 1998.   Clearly, heterogeneity is not the whole story, but it does seem 
to be an important part of the story.    
 
iii-c. Disagreement between Japanese and U.S. Investors 
Although it is something of a digression from the main argument, it is interesting 
and instructive to note the differences of average opinion about the Nikkei between 
Japanese and U.S. institutional investors.   Figure 12 again shows the fraction of Japanese 
institutional investors that regard the Nikkei as overvalued, now adding a second line 
representing the fraction of U.S. institutional investors sharing that view.  As Shiller, 
Kon-Ya, and Tsutsui (1996) stressed, the divergence is striking.    In the second half of 
1989, three quarters of U.S. investors regard the Nikkei as overvalued, while only a 
minority of Japanese respondents holds that view.   The overvaluation beliefs of U.S. 
investors showed up in trading behavior.   As French and Poterba (1991) document, U.S. 
investors reduced their long position in Japanese stocks as the bubble proceeded.  
Disagreement between U.S. and Japanese investors also shows up in Figure 13, 
which shows mean expected returns on the Nikkei of U.S. as well as Japanese investors.    
While Japanese expected high returns during the bubble period, U.S. investors believed, 
at the height of the bubble, that prices would fall.    It is thus important for the generation   27 
and sustenance of the bubble that the U.S. investors could not- or at least did not – sell 
short Nikkei stocks in large quantity, for this might have lead to a “cancelling out” of the 
bullish behavior of the Japanese optimists.   
  The reasons for the strong disagreement between Japanese and U.S. investors are 
not obvious.  One alleged phenomenon that is apparently not the answer was chauvinism 
on the part of Japanese investors.    Figure 14 shows returns on the Dow Jones expected 
by U.S. and Japanese institutional investors, respectively.   Strikingly, during the bubble 
period, Japanese investors were just as unilaterally bullish about the U.S. market as they 
were about the Nikkei.    
iii.d.  Fragility of Heterogeneity-Based Bubbles 
  One might wonder whether the heterogeneity theory is a theory of systematic 
overpricing, rather than of bubbles that arise and then collapse.  However, this is not the 
case.  First, heterogeneity of beliefs is higher at some times than others.  It rises in 
response to news, particularly news that is subject to a variety of alternative 
interpretations – most especially, when one admissible interpretation is a highly 
optimistic one.    Heterogeneity tends to fall as the news is digested.  As long as 
heterogeneity is stationary, bubbles will tend to arise and then attenuate.   Second, 
because bubbles based on heterogeneity are supported by heavy borrowing on the part of 
optimistic investors, such bubbles are sensitive to borrowing conditions  and are prone to 
being pricked by tightening of credit coming either from the central bank or from other 
considerations.      
  Third, Hong and Stein (2003) present a more esoteric argument as to why 
heterogeneity-generated asset price increases are prone to collapse.  They study the case   28 
in which agents agree to disagree because they have differential information sets and are 
overconfident about the relative value of their own information.  In the Hong and Stein 
formulation,  the   heterogeneous beliefs model with short-sale restrictions is particularly 
prone to “crashes” that seem out of proportion to the news that generated them because of 
the pent up information that is in the hands of the pessimists.  The information of these  
would-be short sellers is not initially reflected in the asset price.; once someone is out of 
the market there is nothing to indicate whether his information was just barely adverse 
enough to keep him from a long position, or whether he is quite infra-marginal.   
However, that information may be revealed when the opinions of the optimists shift in an 
adverse direction.   
Imagine that some traders who are long in the stock receive bad news that causes 
them to (partially) unload their positions.   The latent short-sellers who are currently out 
of the market might react in one of two ways.   If their relative pessimism was 
sufficiently small, they may begin to buy as the price falls.  On the other hand, their 
judgment might be sufficiently adverse that even a substantial drop in the price would not 
bring them back into the market with a long position.  The subsequent behavior of the 
price depends importantly on which of these alternatives is in fact the case,   If the latent 
short sellers do not begin to switch to a long position as the price falls, that indicates that 
the adverse information possessed by the latent the short-sellers  was severe.  Their 
failure to return to the market is a “dog that didn‟t bark” that can be the catalyst for a 
further drop in asset prices.   Importantly, there is no corresponding effect on the “up 
side”; those who have gotten good news are long in the stock and thus have already 
revealed their information to the market.     29 
This asymmetry between the effects of good and bad news due to the constraints 
on short-selling tends to show up as negative skewness in higher frequency (daily or 
monthly) price data.  Figure 15 verifies that this is the case for Japan.    It shows a 
histogram  of monthly stock prices over the period 1970-2000.    As predicted, the prices 
are somewhat negatively skewed.  In particular, the largest monthly drop in the Nikkei is 
-22%, while the largest increase is only 17%.   
 
iii.e. Implications of Dynamic Heterogeneity Models 
The ability to explain both “overpricing” without systematic over-optimism and 
proneness to crashes without large negative information shocks is the primary reason that 
disagreement models are an attractive way to think about the Japanese bubble experience.  
As we have seen, these features are well illustrated in the fundamentally static models 
emanating from Miller (1977).  In a dynamic model, additional implications emerge.  
These involve not only price but also trading volume.  They have to do with the 
“crossing” of beliefs between groups of investors who are constantly updating, and the 
trading that ensues when relative pessimists become relative optimists.  First, there arises 
a “speculative premium” reflecting the option value of selling in the future to those 
agents that will emerge as the most optimistic investors, causing  the asset to sell above 
the fundamental evaluation of even the most optimistic group of investors (Harrison and 
Kreps, 1977).    Second, trading volume and volatility are positively correlated with 
differences of opinion and share prices (Scheinkman and Xiong, 2003; Hong and Stein, 
2003).   This is because trading results from pieces of news that are interpreted differently   30 
by different agents, increasing the dispersion of beliefs and thus the degree of optimism 
among the most optimistic.    
In short, the dynamic disagreement theory predicts high volume and high 
volatility at the peak, and a reduction in both at the time of the crash.    Figure 16   
presents data on trading volume and a volatility measure computed from daily data 
alongside the real closing price.  The figure indicates that the prediction for volume is 
borne out handsomely.  Note in particular the dramatic drop in volume in 1990.  The 
volatility prediction, on the other hand, is rejected – volatility seems to be consistently 
higher in the crash period (as it was in the 1987 crash as well); indeed higher volatility 
after crashes seems to be a consistent feature of the data.    
In the dynamic heterogeneity models, the belief that stocks are overvalued relative 
to fundamentals need not translate into an aversion to holding stocks in the short run.   In 
the Harrison and Kreps model, agents are willing to hold a stock at a price that exceeds 
their own fundamental valuations if they believe that next period‟s optimists may be even 
more bullish than today‟s.   Abreu and Brunnermeir (2003) present a model in which 
rational agents receive sequential signals as to whether or not the price is above the 
fundamental level, but there is no common knowledge of others‟ signals.  In their setup, 
even in a situation where all agents have received an overvaluation signal, the absence of 
common knowledge prevents agents from coordinating on when to attack the bubble.  
Rational investors try to stay in as long as possible in order to receive the higher returns 
from “riding the bubble.”    
Does this phenomenon of “riding the bubble” show up in the survey data?   What 
we are looking for here is the conjunction of 1) the belief that stocks are overvalued   31 
relative to fundamentals and/or will have a negative return over some reasonably long 
horizon and 2) the belief that stocks will continue to have a positive return over some 
shorter horizon and are thus a good investment at present.     Figure 17 shows the fraction 
of Japanese institutional respondents that believes that the Nikkei is “too high” along 
with the fraction that expects a negative return over the next year.   While the former 
peaks at 60 percent, the latter never reaches 20 percent.   Similarly, at the height of the 
bubble in the second half of 1989, 39% of the respondents answered true to the statement 
“Although I expect a substantial drop in stock prices in Japan ultimately, I advise being 
relatively heavily invested in stocks for the time being because I think that prices are 
likely to rise for awhile” (Shiller, Kon-Ya, and Tsutsui, 1996).    Thus the survey data 
also reflect some of the phenomena associated specifically with dynamic heterogeneity 
models.  Though driven by disagreements about fundamentals,  these models capture 
some of the flavor of “speculative bubbles” in which “overtrading” and speculative 
purchases of assets with a view towards resale to other market participants are prominent 
features.   
 
IV. Summary and Conclusion 
  Most discussions of the behavior of Japanese stock and land prices in the 
late1980s focus on whether or not the price fluctuations could plausibly be explained in 
terms of rational expectations about fundamentals.  It may instead be useful to classify 
explanations of major asset price changes along two dimensions – a) fundamental versus 
speculative; and b) rational versus not strictly rational.   Thus there is, on the one hand, 
the possibility of “rational speculative bubbles in which fundamentals play no role but 
expectations are strictly rational (Blanchard and Watson, 1982); and, on the other, models   32 
in which prices are determined by beliefs about fundamentals but expectations may not 
be rational in the sense of being consistent with an econometrician‟s best estimate of the 
probability model characterizing fundamentals.   In the extreme, expectations about 
fundamentals may be severely distorted by cognitive errors.  A gentler version involves 
the idea that there are differences of opinion as to what is the “right” model with which to 
interpret the available signals about fundamentals.  This paper tends toward the latter 
view.  
  We began with Kindelberger‟s neutral definition of a bubble as “an upward price 
movement over an extended range that then implodes”.   This allowed us to explore the 
causes of the “Japanese Bubble” without precluding the possibility that “bubbles” are in 
fact due to perceptions of fundamentals.   At the peak of the bubble in the second half of 
1989, the majority of Japanese institutional investors thought that the Nikkei was not 
overvalued.    This observation certainly pushes us toward the view that beliefs about 
fundamentals were at the center of the bubble.   
These beliefs were not entirely unfounded.   Long-term real interest rates fell 
sharply between 1985 and 1986.  Although there is somewhat more ambiguity regarding 
the question of whether the growth rate of the economy rose in a way that could justify a 
substantial increase in asset prices after 1986, there were certainly some signs of such a 
persistent increase in growth, and the view that there was a significant increase in the 
permanent component of the growth rate was defensible though not undeniable.  The 
apparent drop in required returns and rise in the growth rate came on top of initially lower 
dividend and earnings yields, which rendered prices prone to dramatic percentage   33 
increases – as well as dramatic subsequent drops if fundamentals proved not to be as 
favorable as some might have thought.    
Invoking the literature on asset prices with heterogeneous beliefs and limitations 
on short sales, we argued that in a period characterized by the arrival of news that is 
difficult to digest and subject to multiple interpretations, it is the more optimistic 
assessments of fundamentals that are likely to be reflected in the market equilibrium.  At 
the same time, high prices resulting from the heterogeneity phenomenon are fragile and 
prone to collapse.   From this vantage point it is perhaps not surprising that the Japanese 





















Appendix: SKT Survey,  Question Wordings 
1) What do you think the rate of growth of real (inflation adjusted) corporate earnings 
will be on average in Japan over the next 10 years? 
Annual percentage rate: _______________%”  (Asked only of Japanese respondents). 
 
2) "Stock prices in Japan, when compared with measures of true fundamental value or 
sensible investment value are: 
   1. Too low.    2. Too high.    3. About right.   4. Do not know."  (Asked of both 
Japanese and U.S. respondents) 
 
3) "How much of a change in percentage terms do you expect in the Nikkei at [each of 
several horizons]?  (Use + before your number to indicate an expected increase, a - to 
indicate an expected decrease, leave blanks where you do not know: [FILL IN ONE 
NUMBER FOR EACH]" (Asked of both Japanese and U.S. respondents)` 
     35 
 4)"Although I expect a substantial drop in stock prices Japan  ultimately, I advise being 
relatively heavily invested in stocks for the time being because I think that prices are 
likely to rise for a while. 
           1. True   2. False   3. No Opinion”. 
Two questions asking the respondent to interpret the actions of other agents in the market 
are also of interest: 
 
5) "Many people are showing a great deal of excitement and optimism about the 
prospects for the stock market in Japan and I must be careful not to be influenced by 
them.   
            1.  True.        2.   False.    3. No Opinion." 
 
6) "What do you think is the cause of the trend of stock prices in Japan in the past six 
         months?” 
         1. It properly reflects the fundamentals of the U.S. economy and firms. 
         2. It is based on speculative thinking among investors or overreaction to  
  current news. 
         3. Other 
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Year              BOJ Discount Rate  Long-term Bond Yield, 
 Nominal 
Long-term Bond Yield,  
Expected  Real 
 
1982            5.5  7.8  2.4   
1983            5.0  7.4  4.2   
1984                          5.0  6.9  4.4   
1985            5.0  6.3  4.1   
1986            3.0  5.5  2.9   
1987            2.5  5.2  3.3   
1988            2.5  4.8  3.0   
1989            4.3  5.8  3.0   
1990            6.0  6.8  4.0   
         
 
Table I.  Nominal and Real Interest Rates 
Source:  Discount Rate (last trading day of the year): Global Financial Database; 
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Figure 1:  Real Stock Prices, Monthly, 1980 to 1995.  Nikkei 225, Closing 
price on last trading day of the month.  Source: Global Financial Database.  
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Figure 2:  Price of Urban Land in the Six Largest Japanese Cities 
(deflation by consumption deflator).  Annual, 1980-1995.   
Source: Statistics Bureau, Historical Statistics of Japan.   
 












80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92
Dividend Yield (left scale)
Earnings Yield (right scale)
 
Figure 3:   Dividend and Earnings to Price Ratios 
Source: Global Financial Database. Series SYJPNPNM (price-earnings ratio) is 




















Figure 4:  Real Growth in GDP and in Dividends 
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Figure 5: Business and Consumer Confidence Measures.    
Sources:  Tankan Survey: Bank of Japan  





































Figure 6: “Permanent Component” of GDP Growth, Quarterly Data 
1955:2 to 2001:4,  β = .9 
Source: GDP: Japanese National Accounts. Permanent Component: 
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Figure 7:  Ten Year Expected Earnings Growth, 





























Figure 8:   Regression of Log Consumption Expenditure on Log GDP, 
1955-1998. The upper lines show consumption and its fitted value. The  
line below shows the residual from this regression.   Source: Consumption and 
GDP are annual averages at constant prices from Statistics Bureau: Historical 
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Figure 9:  Fraction of Japanese Institutional Investors Who Believe 
Nikkei is Not Too High.  Semi-annual data, 1989:2 to 1995:2.  































Figure 10:  Fraction of Japanese Institutional Investors Seeing Excessive 
Excitement About Stocks and Fraction Regarding Recent Trend as Primarily 
Speculative.  Semi-annual data, 1989:2 to 1995:2. Source: Shiller, Kon-Ya, 


















Figure 11: Nikkei 225 (log real) and Heterogeneity Measure f(1-f), where   
f denotes the fraction of Japanese institutional investors who believe the 
Nikkei is too high relative to fundamentals. 
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Figure 12:  Fraction of U.S. Institutional Investors Believing Nikkei is 
Too High and Fraction of Japanese Institutional Investors Believing 
Nikkei is Too High 
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Figure 13:  Mean Expected One-year Return on Nikkei of a) Japanese 
and b) U.S. institutional investors. Semi-annual data, 1989:2 to 
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Figure 14:  One-Year Expected Return on Dow Jones of a) U.S. and b) 
Japanese Institutional Investors 
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Figure 15: Negative Skewness of Monthly Stock Price Changes: 
Histogram of Change in Log Real Value of Nikkei 225 
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Figure 16:  Real Stock Prices, Trading Volume, and Daily Volatility 
Source: Global Financial Database and author‟s computations. 
 











Figure 17:  Fraction of Japanese Institutional Investors Believing Market is 
“Too High” and Fraction Expecting Negative One -Year Return 
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